Introduction
Under its "Fit for the Future" program, the NSW Office of Local Government (OLG, 2014) requires local councils to demonstrate that they are adopting a local council structure that has scale, strategic capacity and is financially sustainable. This paper addresses the relationship between scale (population) and financial sustainability. In "Fit for the Future", the NSW Government defines a financially sustainable council as "one that, over the long term, is able to generate sufficient funds to provide the level and scope of service agreed with its community through the Integrated Planning and Reporting process". However the Government has pre-empted rational and informed analysis of the efficient financial scale of local councils with its arguments that councils are currently running financial deficits of $1 million a day and that this can be rectified only by councils adopting a scale of organisation in the order of 250,000 persons per mega council as recommended by the Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP, 2013) .
The ILGRP provided no evidence or reference in its report to support their view that larger councils are more financially sustainable than small ones. And, as this paper shows, the NSW Government's equation of scale with financial capacity is both baseless and incorrect. There is no basis for the belief that larger councils are necessary for financial sustainability. This paper makes three main points. Points 2 and 3 are related.
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The State Government has changed a key financial benchmark which was the basis for government rate setting since 1977 and it has exploited this change to allege that many local councils lack financial capacity without taking responsibility for the rate pegging.
Taken singly, and more especially together, these points show that the local council scale and financial capacity are not equivalent. Financial capacity is fundamentally a function of income, not of "scale" however that may be defined. This has important and fundamental implications for the structure of local government and amalgamation policies.
In this paper we demonstrate each of these three main points and draw some important conclusions.
Financial benchmarks and NSW government rate setting
For many decades, both local councils and the OLG have reported revenues inclusive of capital contributions and grants. Consistent with this, council surpluses have been estimated primarily as the difference between total revenue (including capital contributions and grants) and total expenses. Typically an additional row in council accounts has shown council operating results with capital contributions and grants excluded. Table 1 shows how OLG reported total revenue and expenses in its annual reports up to 2012 (when the results for 2010-11 were published). These reports showed total revenue inclusive of capital grants and expenses and total expenses, and we have added the total surpluses into the table. They also showed operating revenue and expense per capita, but not the total operating deficit or operating deficit per capita, which we have estimated and included.
Following the publication of the TCorp report on Financial Sustainability in April 2013, with its strong emphasis on the operating deficit, the OLG radically changed the format of its annual report, dropped total revenue inclusive of capital contributions and grants, and published only the operating revenue as in Table 2 , including retrospective changes to the 2009/10 and 2010/11 figures. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 , these changes make a dramatic difference to the outcomes. Comfortable council surpluses with the inclusion of capital contributions and grants become (operating) deficits without them.
Here three main points should be made. First, we support this change in the accounting definition of a surplus. Ideally current expenses (services) should be met from current revenues and capital grants should be spent on capital expenditure and included in the capital budget. This maximises the net public worth (the net assets) of the community.
However, having said that, a council that runs a net surplus inclusive of capital contributions and grants is increasing the net assets of the local community, even if it is running an operating deficit exclusive of capital grants. These communities are becoming better off, not worse off as some of the rhetoric implies.
The third and most important point relates to the government responsibility for rate pegging and its consequences. The NSW Government has been pegging council rates annually since 1977. The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) took over in 2011/12. The figures since 1989-90 are shown in Table A .1 in the annex.
As shown in Table A .1 and in Figure 1 (next page), between 1999-2000 and 2013-14, regulated rates rose by 56.5% compared with the rise in the CPI of 50.5%, the rise in the wage price index of 63.9% and the rise in nominal GDP (which includes increases in real income as well as price increase) of 134.8.5%.
In other words, despite large rises in population, community incomes and demands, the state government did not allow for any increase in local council services in over 10 years. Moreover, in effect the government was viewing operating deficits without concern. If these deficits had been a concern, the government could surely have allowed rate increases at least up to the increase in GDP. Certainly local councils could apply for rate variations. But evidently the OLG was content with the financial results that it was overseeing and regulating.
Figure 1 Rate pegging, gross domestic product and the CPI
Further, in the rate pegging that followed the TCorp report in April 2013, IPART in December 2013 regulated a miserly 2.3% rate rise for 2014-15. 3 This was the lowest rate increase since 1998-99. Yet, a few months later IPART (September, 2014) wrote "We consider that operating performance ratio is a key measure of financial sustainability and is fundamental for councils to be "fit for the future". If IPART was so concerned about councils' operating deficits, why did it not provide for a higher rate increase?
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In this regulatory environment it does not follow that councils running operating deficits could not run balanced budgets if they were given the authority to do so. The NSW Government made the rules, the benchmarks and the rate pegs. It has now changed the benchmark but not the rate pegs. That is fine. But the state government should accept responsibility for this and not use the rule change to denigrate the financial capacity of local councils.
Financial Capacity and Income
In its major review of the revenue raising capacities of local councils around Australia, the Productivity Commission (2008, p. xviii, p. xxiii) found conclusively that "the fiscal capacity of a council is best measured as the aggregate after-tax income of the community ... The higher is the fiscal capacity of a local government, the higher is its potential to raise revenue. " Fiscal capacity is essentially a function of per capita income levels, not the nature of the rate base.
3 Arguably the real rate increase was 2.6% as IPART allowed an extra 0.3% two years earlier to compensate councils for the carbon tax. This would still be the lowest rate increase since 1999-2000. 4 Given the rate ruling was made only in December 2013, it was impossible for a council to respond to the extensive reporting and consultation requirements involved in seeking a rate rise by mid-February 2014 unless it had started this process several months earlier. It may also be observed that while TCorp (2013) deemed less than 20% of the Sydney metropolitan council areas to have a weak financial outlook, two-thirds of all other councils in NSW were found to have a weak financial outlook (see Annex Figure A .1). TCorp (p. 14) highlights the financial weakness of councils in the north coast and western regions. Nineteen councils in these two regions are among the 24 least financially sustainable regions in NSW.
TCorp also recognises that most of the urban councils that are financially weak or very weak are "in regional areas outside Sydney". Financial weakness is due to low population density as well as low incomes and is principally (though not solely) a non-metropolitan problem. 
Average Taxable Income ($) by Council Expenditure per Capita and Income
As noted at the start of this note, the ILGRP (2013) provided no evidence that larger organisations are more efficient than smaller ones. Certainly larger councils have the potential to achieve more internal economies of scale than smaller councils. However, small councils can generally achieve similar economies of scale by shared services with other councils or by outsourcing some services to large private providers.
Moreover, there is little doubt that organisational and behavioural inefficiency rises with the size of the bureaucracy. Truly it may be said that all bureaucracies waste money and the larger the bureaucracy the more is wasted.
What is the evidence? Dollery et al. (2012) provide detailed and extensive evidence in Australia and internationally that forced amalgamations have not produced financial sustainability or any cost savings. They conclude that anyone who still believes that compulsory council amalgamation leads to financial sustainability in local government, lower costs or scale economies, has not acquainted themselves with the vast empirical literature on amalgamation.
In a further major review, in an international peer reviewed journal, Dollery et al. (2013) cite 15 international studies from the United States, Canada and Europe all of which throw doubt on the claimed economies of consolidated local councils. They then examine 8 Australian national and state-based inquiries into the financial sustainability of local councils over the past decade. They found (p.215) that "with one exception, these inquiries are sceptical of the ability of forced amalgamation to improve local authority financial viability".
On the other hand, in a recent report IPART (September 2014) endorsed the ILGRP view that larger councils are more efficient than small ones. According to IPART, the data showed that "around 30% of the variation in opex per head amongst the councils of Greater Sydney is inversely associated with their population and that opex per head is lower the larger the population of the LGA".
This finding is misleading because it fails to account for the substantial inverse correlation (of − 0.49) between local council size and income levels per capita (see Figure 3) . Smaller councils generally have higher income per capita and hence the local residents expect, and are willing to pay for, more services. Larger councils in Sydney tend to spend less per capita than small ones because of lower income, not greater efficiency. The lower expenditure would indicate efficiency only if the larger councils were producing equivalent services to small ones.
In this paper we test the hypothesis that differences in operating expenditure per head are due primarily to differences in income and find that this hypothesis is strongly validated. Figure 4 depicts this bivariate relationship. Once differences in income are allowed for, the relationship between expenditure per head and population size is not statistically significant. To explain differences in local government expenditure, we collected the latest public data on expenditure per capita, population and average taxable income for the 37 local councils in metropolitan Sydney (excluding the City of Sydney and outlying councils) as shown in Annex Table A .2.
We then ran a regression with expenditure per capita as the dependent variable and population, average taxable income per capita and a dummy variable for major business centres (North Sydney, Willoughby and Parramatta) as explanatory variables. This equation is in log-log form. This means that the coefficients represent percentage changes in both the dependent and the explanatory variables. The results are shown in Table 3 . Differences in taxable income and business centres account for about 50% of the variation in expenditure per head. It should also be noted that there is significant heteroscedasticity and, for this reason, robust standard errors were used.
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On the other hand, after allowing for differences in income per capita, population is NOT statistically significant at the 10% level of significance (the p-value is greater than 0.10). This means that the coefficient does not satisfy the statistical test that it is clearly different from zero.
Finally it may be remarked that even if population size were marginally significant (which it is not), this could be due to the greater inclusiveness of small population areas which, other things such as income being equal, tend to want a greater supply of local services. For example, research that we have done shows that volunteering is substantially greater per head of population in small councils than in large one.
Conclusions
As the Productivity Commission (2008) showed and as we have shown in this paper, financial sustainability or capacity is fundamentally a function of local community income. It is not a function of council size. The ILGRP produced no evidence to show that financial capacity is a function of the size or scale of a council area and no evidence to show that mega councils of 250,000 people or more are efficient or produce the services that local community want. Nor has the OLG been able to explain why population scale and financial capacity are synonymous.
As this paper has shown most councils in the Sydney Metropolitan area would be able to run financially sustainable, balanced, operating budgets if they were able to determine their own rates and were not subject to rate pegging. It is irresponsible to decry operating deficits and then in 2014-15 to allow the lowest rate increase in 15 years. On the other hand, less well-off and lower density council areas, especially outside the Sydney Metropolitan area, would need financial assistance with, or without, amalgamation.
Finally it should be noted that this paper has been concerned with financial capacity as this is a core focus of the "Fit for the Future" requirements. We recognise that there are other important issues, including the provision of local services and care for the local environment on the one hand and metropolitan and state wide planning of transport, housing and other infrastructure on the other hand.
It is strongly our view that small and medium sized local councils are by far the best vehicles for provision of local services and for protection of the local environment. In the famous words of Montesquieu ( 1748), "In a small republic, the public good is more strongly felt, better known and closer to the citizen".
Other vehicles such as Joint (Regional) Organisations may be needed to facilitate the provision of metropolitan and state infrastructure or, in the language of Fit for the Future, to provide "strategic capacity". Regrettably discussion of strategic capacity to date, including in the ILGRP report, has been characterised more by slogans and rhetoric than by careful, evidence-based, discussion of the real issues. 
